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Abstract: 
This paper uses administrative longitudinal micro-data from the Italian Social Security 
Institute (INPS) to estimate the extent of downward nominal wage rigidity. The 
determinants of wage changes are explicitly modelled, as is the measurement error 
deriving from the fact that earnings inclusive of benefits, not hourly wages, are 
available in the data. Estimates show that the degree of downward nominal wage 
rigidity is medium/high – between 51% and 68% of all notional wage cuts being 
prevented by the existence of proportional rigidity. The implications of the estimated 
nominal wage rigidity for the real side of the economy are also explored.       
Keywords: Nominal wage rigidity, measurement error, proportional and threshold 
rigidity models, natural unemployment rate. 
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1. Introduction 
The existence of wage rigidities has traditionally occupied, and even more often 
preoccupied, entire generations of economists, of any school and inspiration. Wages 
that do not duly respond to the changing economic conditions of the markets are held to 
be rigid, or more optimistically, sticky. Market adjustment processes - unable to rely on 
the re-equilibrating forces of prices - are then bound to unburden themselves on 
something else, quantities above all.  
As macroeconomics textbook predicate, nominal wage rigidity is one of the 
possible reasons for the existence of an upward sloping aggregate supply, and the 
resulting short-run trade-off between unemployment and inflation – the known Phillips 
curve – at the root of the Keynesian stabilization policies. Other economists point 
instead to real wage rigidities – and the institutional aspects (unions but also firms’ 
strategic behaviour in the presence of market imperfections) responsible for wage levels 
incompatible with the labour market equilibrium – as the main cause of high and 
persistent levels of unemployment rates.  
In Italy the vast territorial differences have sometimes lead to believe that an 
increased flexibility in the wage bargaining mechanisms may contribute to reinstate the 
convergence processes between the rich and developed north and the poorer and 
backward south of the country. 
The inflation targets that monetary authorities should pursue have also been 
suggested to depend on the extent of wage rigidity. For, if on the face of downwardly 
rigid nominal wages it may be desirable to accept a positive rate of inflation (which 
would cool down real wage growth and “grease” the wheels of the economy), it would 
instead be optimal to aim at zero inflation if wages are perfectly flexible. This way, in  
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fact, the efficiency costs spread in the economic system by wrong price signals (which 
throw “sand” on the economy wheels) may be avoided (Akerlof et al., 1996).  
But if wage rigidity occupies such a central place in economic theory and policy, a 
question which logically should precede, and therefore inform, any relating debate 
should be: Are wages really rigid? And how much? Since it is difficult to reconcile the 
hypothesis of wage rigidity with the postulate of rational behaviour (e.g., Romer, 1996 – 
put in references)
1, it is particularly important to know whether the validity of the 
hypothesis can be confirmed empirically. 
Surprising as it might seem, finding a satisfactory answer to such a legitimate 
question is not easy enterprise, for Italy as well as for many other industrialised 
countries. Empirical research has of course not failed to quantify the relationship at a 
country level between wage growth (or price inflation)  and unemployment rates, 
estimating Phillips curves and wage adjustment processes over time. However, these 
estimates have mainly been carried out at an aggregate level (time series), distant by its 
own nature from the optimising behavioural processes of the single economic agents 
(firms and employees)) and unable to fully recognise the heterogeneity of such agents. 
Because the presence of inertia in wage adjustments ultimately derives from the optimal 
choices of rational agents (under various forms of information, institutional and 
technological constraints), a microeconomic approach appear to be at least as desirable 
as the traditional macro perspective employed in early research on the topic. The recent 
acquisition of longitudinal micro-datasets – particularly absent in Italy - has contributed 
to extending the scope for micro-oriented research on wage rigidity.  
                                                 
1 Some model builders, for instance, reject DNWR on the grounds that it implies money illusion of the 
economic agents.   
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A burgeoning literature has already provided evidence of the existence of some 
downward nominal wage rigidity (henceforth, DNWR) in a number of countries 
(notably the US, UK, Germany, Canada, Switzerland), but no such empirical 
investigation has been undertaken in Italy as yet.
2 The aim of this paper is to contribute 
to this literature by studying the Italian case, drawing on recently available 
administrative data from the Italian Institute for Social Security (INPS). First, the 
overall degree of nominal wage rigidity will be estimates using various econometric 
techniques. Then, the estimates will be used to derive the real implications of the 
observed dynamics of wage changes, in terms of their costs for the long-run 
unemployment rate and output.   
Assessing the extent and the effects of nominal rigidities is all the more important in 
a country which has been standing out for its relatively high and persistent 
unemployment rate throughout the eighties and the nineties – at least when compared to 
other EU countries. The presence of fairly strict employment legislation protection in 
the Italian labour market provides additional reasons for investigating the extent of 
nominal wage rigidity. For, as Bewley (2000) suggests, it may be possible (and indeed 
this is what he finds for the US) that layoffs are a tool preferred by managers to nominal 
wage cuts when in need to restore their firm’s competitiveness, as these cuts would have 
an adverse effect on employees’ morale. While the available data are all but ideal to 
                                                 
2 A related literature on the estimation of the so-called wage curve has empirically investigated the 
dynamics of real wages around their equilibrium level and the real wage rigidities at the root of the 
equilibrium (“natural” or long-run) unemployment rate (e.g., Layard et al., 1991). The dynamics and 
rigidity of real wages in Italy have been explored by Lucifora and Orrigo (1999). As the consequences of 
nominal wage (or price) rigidity are often strengthen by the presence of real rigidities, the present paper 
(and related literature) constitute an essential element for a complete assessment of the macroeconomics 
policy trade-offs. Note that real rigidities (e.g., due to unions or efficiency wage considerations) – while 
potentially implying the existence of a positive natural rate of unemployment – need not entail a short run 
trade-off between inflation and unemployment (e.g., Romer, 1996, ch. 6).     
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confront Bewely’s prediction to Italian practice, the modelling strategy can at least 
provide some preliminary evidence on the matter. 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 briefly describes wage-setting practises 
in Italy, which have important implications for both our modelling strategy and results’ 
interpretation. Section 3 provides details about the data used and the sample selection, 
while section 4 describes the empirical evidence on the distribution of wage changes. In 
section 5 the modelling approach is explained, while results are illustrated in section 6. 
Section 7 then explores the real consequences of the estimated degree of nominal wage 
rigidity. Some final considerations are gathered in section 7.  
 
    
2. Wage Setting Practices in Italy 
Italy’s wage setting process has been and still is dominated by industry wide national 
unions’ wage contracts. These are formally binding only for the firms belonging to the 
employers’ associations who have signed them. However, both the courts (in case of 
worker-firm disputes) and the law (which subordinates some firms’ benefits to the use 
of those contracts and computes employers’ social security contributions as a % to be 
applied to the maximum between actual earnings and those fixed by national contracts) 
somehow extend their actual coverage. Therefore the non-covered sector may be 
identified with the “hidden” economy, estimated to be around the 15% of total 
employment in 1998 by ISTAT (the national statistical office).
3 
Firms’ level bargaining is quite widespread in at least the largest firms, which are 
however a minority in Italy’s landscape. The contracts there signed top up national 
wages and, particularly in the periods of stronger unions’ power (since the mid ‘60s to 
                                                 
3 To a large extent, and particularly in the less developed and high unemployment Mezzogiorno, the 
hidden economy features pertain not only to the avoidance of the tax and social security contributions 
burden but also to the use of sub-standard wages and working relations rules.  
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the beginning of the ‘80s), “anticipated” the issues subsequently generalised through 
industry wide contracts. Wage rises dictated at the firm level through unions’ bargaining 
are quite egalitarian (within the firm itself).  
An opposite nature have the autonomous firms’ wage policies. Both these and 
individual worker-firm bargaining had been quite compressed during the period of 
stronger unions’ power. However, since the mid ‘80s these components have acquired 
some role. Presently, these components represent between 5 and 10% of average 
earnings, another 10% being dictated by firms’ level contracts.  
The Italian pyramidal wage bargaining (whereby wage contracts can be bargained at 
the national, industry and firm level, with agreements struck at a higher level 
immediately becoming lower bounds for bargaining at lower levels) limits the scope for 
downward wage flexibility at the firm level. This has to be borne in mind when, say, 
comparing the Italian experience with that of the US, where instead bargaining is 
mainly conducted at the firm level. Employment protection is stronger too, particularly 
for large firms, which suggests that firms in Italy will have to find alternative ways to 
circumvent the labour market inflexibility (both in terms of wages and quantities), for 
example through cautious intertemporal smoothing of wage and employment changes, 
or through the strategic use of more flexible components of wages such as benefits and 
overtime.      
As far as nominal adjustment to price inflation is concerned, important changes have 
taken place during the ‘90s. Up to 1992 nominal wages were indexed to prices through 
an automatic mechanism known as scala mobile whose rules were uniform across 
sectors. Actually, given the relevance of such an automatic mechanism, the above 
mentioned predominance of industry wide bargaining may be questioned. From the end  
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of WWII to 1975 price inflation triggered each quarter wage rises differentiated across 
sectors and job categories
4. The adjustment was asymmetric, as it operated only in case 
of price rises, and was meant to safeguard a given minimum threshold real wage 
(differentiated across sectors and job categories)
5. Over time, as real wages were rising 
the actual safeguard granted by the mechanism declined and upward adjustments of the 
threshold wage levels were agreed upon several times at national level. In 1975 one of 
these periodical re-adjustments took place. On top of incorporating the large real wage 
rises contracted for during the previous years, the agreement profoundly changed the 
general rules: the quarterly wage rises were made uniform across sectors and job 
categories lifting up the fixed amount wage rises granted to the lowest paid sectors and 
job categories. This increased the average degree of safeguard against price inflation 
(which peaked at around 100% in 1978-1979) and imparted a strong egalitarian bias to 
the overall mechanism (low paid workers were automatically gaining ground in case of 
price inflation).  
The scala mobile quite soon came under attack for its inflationary bias. The high 
degree of safeguard provided for was a source of real wage resistance against terms of 
trade shocks (particularly the oil prices’ hikes experienced in 1974 and 1979) and 
indirect taxes rises. The quarterly timing speeded up the inflationary spiral. The 
egalitarian bias was affecting wage differentials and restricting the role for autonomous 
firms’ and unions’ decisions as the scala mobile automatisms were responsible for most 
of the wage dynamics. 
                                                 
4 Up to the end of the ‘60s the wage rises were also differentiated across regions as the national contracts 
themselves, while agreed upon at the national level, provided for wage categories differentiated across 
regions (the so called gabbie salariali). 
5 On average the actual safeguard against price rises (defined as the % increase in nominal wages 
triggered by a .01% price rise) was around 50% in mid ‘70s.   
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In 1986 – the first year available in the sample used below for the empirical analysis 
is 1985 – the mechanism was partially reformed. Its timing became half-yearly. Both 
the average safeguard granted for and the egalitarian bias were reduced: a 100% 
safeguard was granted to a minimum uniform wage threshold, with a 25% safeguard 
granted to the difference between the nationally contracted for wage (differentiated 
across industries and broad job categories) and that common minimum threshold.
6 On 
average the safeguard against price rises declined to around 60%. 
In 1992 the scala mobile was finally dismantled. The formal agreements signed up in 
July 1992 and July 1993 depicted a new bargaining system, in which national contracts, 
to be agreed upon every two years (against the 3 years of the previous set up
7), are 
supposed to be guided by the price inflation expected (and targeted by the Government) 
for the future, while firms’ level bargaining is supposed to be geared by profit sharing 
considerations. Past inflation triggers automatic wage rises only in case no agreement is 
reached, and the safeguard granted is at most 50%. The difference between actual and 
targeted inflation is not automatically recovered: it has to be taken into account when a 
new bargaining deal starts. In such a case, however, unions and employers’ associations 
have also to consider the reasons for such a discrepancy, in particular taking into 
account whether it was caused by terms of trade shocks against which employees are 
not anymore automatically insured. 
 
3. Data, Definitions and Sample Selection 
For the analysis of nominal wage rigidity in Italy I use administrative data from the 
Italian Institute for Social Security (INPS), containing information on a sample of 
                                                 
6 No automatic safeguard was granted for the topping up of wages bargained for at the firm or at the 
individual level. 
7 In the current set up national contracts deal with more regulatory aspects every 4 years.  
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employees over a period of twelve years – from 1985 up to 1996. For each calendar 
year 1985/1996, the Social Security forms of employees born on 10 March, June, 
September and December of any year were selected. In this way a sequence of random 
samples of the population of employees is formed (sampling ratio 1:91). Each yearly 
sample includes approximately 100,000 employees of Italian private firms, with the 
exclusion of workers in agriculture and the central state administration. Using available 
identifiers (fiscal and social security codes), individual longitudinal data can be 
generated for each worker. The firm’s longitudinal records are then accessed for each 
worker in the sample and the employer’s attributes are linked to the employee, 
obtaining a matched employer-employee database. The data therefore include not only 
individuals’ wage and career histories but also a certain number of characteristics of 
each worker and of the firm where s/he currently works and has held previous jobs. 
Among personal characteristics, we have information about the employee’s gender, age, 
geographical region where s/he was employed, along with his/her job qualification. 
Information about the firm where the job is held includes the firm’s sector of activity, 
dates of opening and closure and its occupational trend (number of manual and non-
manual workers, along with total remuneration to the two occupational groups).  
As we do not observe the actual number of hours worked by an employee, we cannot 
compute hourly wages. We do however know the number of “paid days”
8 of each 
employee in each job spells and his/her total remuneration (inclusive of overtime and 
fringe benefits), which allows us to compute the employee’s daily wage. It is the year-
to-year changes in this nominal wage rate that lie at the heart of my examination of 
downward rigidity. 
                                                 
8 Some of these paid days may not be worked days, since, included under this heading are periods of paid 
time during which no work is done, e.g., maternity leave, sick leave, holiday.   
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Since the domain of the data source is limited to employment in the private sector, 
another limitation of the data is that periods between employment spells cannot be 
characterized in a precise way. In other words, it is not possible to distinguish between 
individuals’ movements to unemployment, self-employment, employment in the public 
sector and exits from the labour force. Moreover, the data do not identify the reasons for 
a job separation, thus preventing us form distinguishing between employees’ layoffs 
and quits. 
The sample of workers whose wage changes are put under observation has been 
restricted so as to reflect a high labour market attachment. In particular, the paper 
focuses on full-time year-round workers, aged between 15 and 64 and who are job 
stayers (keep a job in the same firm in both years in which the wage is compared). 
Descriptive statistics are collected in Appendix A, Table 2. 
I trim the sample by excluding 1% of wage change observations in each tail. The 
effect of the trim is to exclude wage changes that involve cuts of greater than 23% and 
increases of greater than 38%, which might be thought of as resulting from mis-
reporting of either total remuneration or worked days or both. To further minimize the 
measurement error deriving from variability in the amount of work, I have also 
performed all computations after restricting the sample to all employees working 
exactly 312 days in the year (equivalent to 52 weeks a year). These are workers in 
regular and stable jobs and it might be held that estimated wage dynamics and nominal 
rigidities is higher than in the overall labour market, where more precarious and flexible 
jobs also exist. The results obtained with this restricted sample (which I will refer to as 
“stable” workers) are then compared to those obtained over the sample of employees 
reporting any number of worked and paid days in the year (what I will refer to as “all  
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workers”). Finally, estimates are also presented for the subsample of men only, which 
allows to investigate if the dynamics of nominal wages is different across gender. A 
quick inspection to part A (all workers), B (“stable” workers) and C (“stable” men) of 
Table 2 reveals that the three samples are very different in terms of characteristics. 
About 55% of all workers report exactly 312 paid days per year and, compared to all 
workers, tend to have slightly higher mean wage growth, to be employed in larger and 
expanding firms, to be older,  more concentrated in the north of the country, more likely 
to be white collars and male, and in older firms. When further restricting to men 
employees only, these differences – which are not unexpected - further enlarge, but 
remain overall fairly small, and unlikely to produce major differences in the estimates of 
nominal wage rigidity.  
 
4. The Distribution Of Wage Changes: Descriptive Evidence  
The distribution of nominal wage changes in Italy does not show up the typical 
regularities that have been found for Britain and the US. For example, while big spikes 
at zero wage growth are often reported – and been referred to as a clear hint of 
downward nominal wage rigidity – no such thing is perceptible in our data. For each 
year in the sample, Figure 1 and Table 1 illustrate the distributions of one-year wage 
changes, measured in terms of log wage differences. A vertical line at zero wage growth 
has been drawn in Figure 1, as well as a line indicating the value of inflation for the year 
considered.  
Besides the absence of any sizeable mass of concentration at zero growth, three 
important features are noticeable in Figure 1. First, the distributions appear to be centred 
on a positive value of wage growth, which is generally equal or above the inflation rate  
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registered for the year. The last two columns of Table 1 show that inflation was for 
example about 5.8% in 1985, while the median wage change was around 6.7% (and the 
median wage growth was 7.6%).
9 As a result, more than half of the employees in 1985 
saw their real wages increase, perhaps reflecting a period of productivity growth. 
Inflation in subsequent years was not very different, reaching its highest value in 1989 
at about 6.5% and its minimum at the end of the period, in 1996, when prices grew on 
average by 4%. The central location of the distributions depicted in Figure 1 in general 
follows the behaviour of inflation over time (see also Figure 3B), though the two do not 
always move in the same direction in the short run. In particular a compression of real 
wages can be detected during the years 1991-1994 when the median wage change is 
pushed below the level of inflation by the economic slowdown that characterized those 
years (see Table 1). In fact, while before 1991 median wage growth always exceed 
inflation by at least 1 percentage point, the two become almost indistinguishable 
thereafter.  
A second distinctive feature of the wage change distribution is that numerous 
negative changes co-exist with a majority of wage increases, resulting in distributions 
that – though fairly skewed to the right in some years – look generally and surprisingly 
more symmetric than one would expect. As reported in Table 1, in 1985 about 8% of 
wage changes were wage cuts, with a median drop of almost 4%. In contrast, 89% of 
employees experiencing changes in their annual pay saw their nominal wage increase. 
The proportion of wage cuts reaches its highest value in 1992, at the heart of the period 
of economic slowdown. Correspondingly, the proportion of wage increases fall (at 82%) 
and the median raise dropped at only 5.7%. Figure 3A suggests that the proportions of 
                                                 
9 Mean wage growth is always higher than the median, and in 1985 was at 8.7%.  
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wage cuts and freezes are inversely related to inflation, while figure 3B visualizes the 
positive correlation existing between inflation and mean wage changes.  
The third characteristic of the distributions of nominal wage changes is the low 
percentage of employees whose wage was unaltered over two consecutive years (wage 
freezes). In fact, on average about 3% of the sample experienced zero wage growth. 
This result contrasts to what has been reported for the US and UK, where spikes at zero 
are clearly visible in each year. For instance, Smith (2000), reports that “…on average 
9.0% of non-job changers experienced exactly zero annual growth in their usual gross 
weekly pay during 1992-6”. Even higher were the corresponding figures found for the 
US (see, Card and Hyslop, 1996). 
Taken at their face value, the results discussed in this section would suggest that the 
structure of nominal wage changes is compatible with a labour market characterised by 
a fairly high degree of flexibility, as it would appear that there are no big constraints for 
firms to reduce the wages they pay if they so need do. However, this description may be 
a surprising one for Italy, traditionally included in the list of countries with rigid labour 
market institutions. The possibility that our simple descriptive evidence is unable to 
reveal the “true” – and much higher – degree of downward nominal wage rigidity is 
investigated in the following section. An econometric approach is employed, aiming at 
estimating the extent of “frictions” in the labour markets, controlling for (1) various 
observable determinants of the underlying rigidity-free wage changes, and (2) the likely 
presence of measurement errors in the available data. The key question I attempt to 
address with the econometric model is whether the relatively high proportion of wage 
cuts revealed by the preliminary data inspection is real or reflects instead errors in 
measured wages. In particular, in my sample wage changes may result from variation in  
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the amount of work supplied (overtime, hours worked), strategic mis-reporting of 
remuneration or days worked by firms
10, fridge benefits as well as traditional 
measurement error. For example, daily wages are computed by dividing total 
remuneration by the number of days each employee is paid for. But paid days may not 
coincide with worked days, as the former include period of pay time during which no 
work is done (maternity leave, sick leave, holiday). The econometric methodology 
applied below aims at circumventing our inability to observe these wage components 
separately in the data. The same methodology has been followed for studying nominal 
wage rigidity in Germany (Knoppik and Beissenger, 2001), the US (Altonji and 
Devereux, 1999), Switzerland (Fehr and Goette, 2000), Canada (Fares and Seamus, 
2000) who have all shown the importance of controlling for measurement error in 
estimating the true degree of nominal wage rigidity.      
 
5. Econometric methodology 
Following the notation of Knoppik and Beissinger (2001), I call notional wage 
change that change in the nominal wage that would have occurred in the absence of 
nominal downward wage rigidity. For individual i at time t this is denoted by 
*
it w ∆  and 
is assumed to be explained by a vector  it X  of characteristics as follows: 
(1)   it it it X w ε β + = ∆
*  
where  β   is a vector of parameters to be estimated and  it ε ∼ N(0,
2
ε σ ) represents the 
effect of i.i.d normally distributed error terms. 
The actual wage change 
a
it w ∆  is equal to the notional one, whenever the latter is 
positive. If the notional wage change is negative, it is assumed that the actual change 
                                                 
10 That Italian firms – particularly in the south of the country – might find it convenient to underreport the 
actual number of days worked by the employee has been suggested by Contini et al. (2000).   
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will be negative too when the individual is not affected by DNWR; if instead the 
individual is affected by DNWR, then the observed wage change will be zero. Whether 
the individual’s notional wage is constrained by DNWR is unobservable, and is 
described by a random variable  it D - taking value 1 if individual i at time t experiences 
DNWR, and 0 otherwise, with probabilities: 
(2)   Prob( it D =1) = ρ  and Prob( it D =0) = 1- ρ. 
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This is a model with proportional downward wage rigidity, since a proportion ρ of 
notional wage cuts will not occur due to the presence of rigidity. The degree of rigidity 
is captured by the parameters ρ, which can be estimated by he data.  
When estimating (3) one complication arises from our inability to observe hourly 
wages, as our data contain only information on changes in daily wages (earnings), 
which are denoted by  it y ∆ . Observable changes in earnings can be interpreted as being 
the sum of changes in actual wage rates and a random variable,  it µ , which can capture 
(unobservable) variation in working hours, fridge benefits, bonuses and more 
conventional measurement errors: 
(4)     it
a
it it w y µ + ∆ = ∆  
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Various distributional assumptions can be adopted for the measurement error  it µ , 
each implying a different degree of correctness in the measurement of the dependent 
variable. According to (6), all observations in the sample are measured with errors, and 
it is assumed that these are distributed normally. I will refer to the resulting model as a 
normal measurement error model (NME). 
(6)   it µ ∼ N(0,
2
µ σ )       
 
The working of the models in (3) and (5)-(6) is intuitively illustrated in picture 2. 
Consider first model (3) where measurement error is assumed away. In this case look at 
the bold lines of the figure only and neglect the sparse points in the graph. Any negative 
notional change results in a corresponding actual wage change after it is being allocated 
to either of the two branches in the left part of figure 1. Given the absence of 
measurement error, observed wage freezes automatically imply that the notional wage 
cut has been forced to lie on the horizontal branch in the left part of the picture. Given 
the determinants of the notional wage change, the percentage of wage freezes in the data  
is therefore the crucial information to estimate ρ. Now consider the model in (5)-(6). In 
this case, the presence of measurement error results in the sparse points depicted in the 
graphs: a notional wage cut which is not implemented due to the DNWR constraint 
need not lye on the horizontal axis anymore. In this case, even with no observed wage 
freezes in the sample, the model will allocate some of the observed wage cuts to the 
horizontal branch and some to the 45-degree line brunch, the best fitting resulting in the 
estimate of ρ.  
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In the literature of nominal rigidity more general versions of the models specified 
above have also been estimated, notably by assuming that only a fraction of the 
observations be affected by measurement errors. For example, one can suppose that that 
only a proportion 1-p of the observations are measured with (normally distributed) 
errors, while for the remaining observations µit is equal to zero, obtaining a mixed 
measurement error model (see Altonji and Devereux, 1999; Beissenger and Knoppik, 
2001). These formulations may be attractive as they do not suffer from one potentially 
important shortcoming of the models with normal measurement error (and p=0), namely 
that they are inconsistent with a spike in wage change at 0. However, the benefit of 
using these more general models may be less striking in our data as such spike is not 
observed. Estimates obtained with these more general formulations are nonetheless 
presented in what follows, with all  result tables collected in Appendix A. 
Appendix B derives the likelihood functions implied by each of the models described 
in this paper, which are maximised to obtain the estimates of the parameters of interest. 
 
6. Estimation Results 
The determinants of wage changes 
The set of explanatory variables entering the notional wage equation (1) includes: 
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(i)  age and age squared (scaled variables, /100)  
(ii)  occupation dummies: white collar, manager, apprentice (reference category: 
blue collar) 
(iii)  industry dummies, denoted sector1-7 (reference category: manufacturing, 
food/“alimentary”, textile) 
(iv)   dummies for firms that between year t and t+1 have increased the number of 
employees (“growing”), or reduced (“shrinking”).  
(v)  the (log of) firm size and its square. 
(vi)  inflation and lagged inflation  
(vii)  national unemployment and its lagged values  
(viii)  a dummy for female, and its interaction with age 
(ix)  regional dummies for North West, North East, Centre and South 
(x)  dummies for the age of the firm  
(xi)  a time trend 
 
Similar variables have also been used by the existing papers on downward nominal 
wage rigidity, and differences mainly arises form the data availability (e.g., most papers 
enter education as an explanatory variable, but the INPS data do not contain it). In all 
the models that I have estimated, the impact of observed heterogeneity on wage changes 
(the X variables described above) is generally highly significant and of the expected 
sign. As we are not particularly interested in the effects of these variables – the focus 
being on estimating the amount of rigidity existing in the system – I will briefly 
comment them with reference to an initial OLS equation describing the determinants of 
wage changes, which does not control for the effect of measurement error nor does it 
estimate the amount of frictions in the system (see Table 3). All models have been  
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estimated for (i) the sample of all full-time workers with at least one worked day per 
each month in the year (“all workers” sample), (ii) the sample of workers for whom 
exactly 312 paid dais have been reported (“stable workers” sample), and (iii) the sample 
of men workers with exactly 312 days (“stable men” sample). The results for the three 
sub-samples did never differ sensibly, so I will not discuss them in detail. One 
interesting implication is that – while female wage dynamics is a bit different than 
male’s, as shown below – this has not strong implications for the estimate of nominal 
wage rigidity, particularly so once the sample of employees in stable jobs has been 
selected. This is not surprising, as the literature has long suggested that the main gender 
differences are to be found in the participation decision processes, while conditioning 
on employment – and even more so on stable employment – remaining differences are 
less dramatic.    
Estimation also took account of the fact that the sample data consisted of 
observations on individuals from the same firm at each t, and repeated observations on 
the same individuals across successive pairs of periods, because I pooled wage changes 
from my panel. These repeated observations mean that the i.i.d. assumption is violated. 
To account for this, I use a pseudo maximum likelihood estimator, as follows. The 
complex survey statistics literature has developed methods for adjusting the estimates of 
the parameter of the covariance matrix to account for sample clustering, using formulae 
that allow for arbitrary correlation between observation within the same cluster. See 
inter alia Huber (1967), Binder (1983) and White (1982). I defined each cluster to 
consist of all the employees who were members of the same firm at year t (which very 
often means that the employee is in the same firm in successive pairs of years too). The 
sample log-likelihood is a ‘pseudo-likelihood’ in this case (Gourieroux and Monfort,  
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1996), from which can be derived a ‘robust’ variance estimator of the parameter 
estimates using Taylor series linearization. None of the paper on nominal wage 
flexibility that I know of produce robust standard error, though their data are likely to 
present similar clustering problems.   
In the OLS regressions of Table 3, individual’s age is found to have a negative 
impact on wage changes, consistently with the “classic” profile of wage levels with 
respect to age, which is found to be increasing at decreasing rates. Age squared is here 
intended to capture the presence of higher order polynomials in age. White collars and 
managers tend to have higher wage growth than blue collars. Though a bit more 
surprisingly, the same seems to be true for apprentices.  
Female employees have a lower wage growth than male’s, but tend to reduce the 
distance with their male counterpart as they grow older and acquire labour market 
experience, as shown by the interaction between the dummy for female and age.   
Expanding firms often grant wage increases, as reflected by a positive coefficient of 
the dummy “growing”; the opposite occurs for “shrinking” firms. Those working in 
large firms too seem to obtain bigger wage increases than in smaller firms. There is also 
some evidence than employees in firms aged less than 5 years, or more than 10, manage 
to get larger wage raises than those working in the reference category (firm aged 5-10 
years).     
As expected, nominal wages are highly responsive to inflation: when this grows, 
wages grow too and workers get protected by various institutional arrangements – such 
as the scala mobile in operation until 1992 – as well as by re-negotiations aimed at 
maintaining unaltered the real purchasing power of their wages. Strangely enough, 
though, past inflation enters the notional wage change equation with a negative sign.  
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Consistently with a typical Phillips-curve argument, the rate of unemployment has a 
negative coefficient, indicating that when there are many unemployed wages tend to 
decline. The difference between current and lagged unemployment (a proxy for the 
deviation of current unemployment from its equilibrium level) has a negative 
coefficient, as it is generally found in the literature.  
A negative time trend is supported by the data, capturing - in a crude way as it is - 
the effect of various institutional changes occurred in the labour market over the time 
period considered, notably the slow but constant phasing out of the scala mobile, as 
described in section 2.  
 
Estimated downward nominal rigidity 
As about the estimated degree of rigidity, Table 4 displays the results obtained with 
the model (3), which does not control for measurement error. For the three sub-sample 
considered, the estimated degree of rigidity is fairly low, with ρ  equal to about 21%, 
implying that less than one out of four wage cuts are actually prevented by the existence 
of any rigidity in the system. This should not come as a surprise. Given the low 
percentage of wage changes that are exactly zero, and the relatively high share of wage 
cuts (see Table 1) that, more importantly still, are interpreted by model (3) as “true” 
changes, rather than the result of measurement error, it might have been expected that 
the structure in (3) can fit the data only by making the estimated ρ fairly small.  
Once again, one could then be tempted to draw the conclusion that the system at 
study hardly displays any rigidity at all. However, when starting worrying about the 
impact of measurement errors things soon change. For example, when we recode the 
observations with very low wage changes (between -.5% and +.5%) as exact zeros, and  
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re-estimate the same model, then get a higher and higher value of ρ. Instead of 
arbitrarily deciding which small wage cuts are to be regarded as exact zero wage 
changes, the models I estimate below explicitly introduce measurement errors, thereby 
allowing for the possibility that some of the underlying zero changes may actually 
display themselves as non-zero changes. 
 
The estimates of the model with proportional rigidity described in (5) when 
measurement error is assumed to be normal as in (6) are reported the results in Table 4. 
The effect of observed characteristics is not very different from what we have seen in 
the previous model, and will not be further discussed. The standard deviation of the 
error term entering the notional wage change equation (1) is at about 0.07. The standard 
deviation of the measurement error term µ is estimated at about 0.03 and is significant, 
confirming the importance of allowing for an imperfectly observed dependent variable 
in the model. In Table 4 it is reported a sizeable increase in the estimated value of ρ, 
which is now at about 61-63%, depending on the sub-sample considered.  
Many of the observed wage cuts are treated by model (5) as arising from 
measurement errors, rather than being “true” adjustments. On the other hand, some of 
these observed cuts are now identified as would-be wage freezes which, due to 
measurement error, do not manifest themselves in the form of exact zero wage growth. 
As a result, the estimated ρ is now much higher and implies that six in ten notional 
wage cuts are not implemented due to the operation of downward nominal wage 
rigidity.  
Table 5 displays the estimates obtained when model (5) is generalised to include 
mixed measurement errors, whereby a proportion  p of the observations is assumed to  
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be exactly measured, µ=0, while the remaining 1- p are measured imperfectly and the 
error term is assumed to be normally distributed. In this case, p is estimated to be 
between 59 and 65% (depending on the sub-sample considered), while the estimate of 
the degree of rigidity is only slightly different than before: ρ  now lies in the range 51% 
and 68%.
11 What is interesting to note in this model formulation, is that the reduction of 
the proportion of exactly measured observations (that in the models in Table 4 was by 
definition  equal to zero) is accompanied by an increase in the variance of the 
measurement error variable  it µ . This makes sense and implies that the model is trading-
off the number of observation subject to measurement error with the size of the error 
variability: fewer observations report measurement error in model (5) than in model (3), 
but with a higher variance.  
Before moving to briefly analyse a few alternative models (next section) and the 
implication of the estimated rigidity for the real side of the economy (section 7), it is 
worth spending a few words on a potential trade-off between downward wage rigidity 
and employment flexibility. In fact, one might pose that where employment protection 
is strict, firm’s may attempt to re-gain some degree flexibility - in the face of shocks in 
the demand for their output – by making wage cuts more likely and loosening the 
constraint of DNWR. This would also be in line with Bewely’s predictions that 
managers prefer workers’ dismissal – when this is an open option - to the adverse effect 
of wage cuts.  
In this respect, note that the sample of “all workers” and that of “stable workers” 
differ in the important dimension that the second selects all workers in regular and 
guaranteed jobs, while included in the first are also those employees in more precarious 
                                                 
11 Values of lnL are not comparable between the models with normal measurement error and those with 
mixed measurement error because of the mass point in the latter.   
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and flexible jobs. Firms have therefore less room for employment dismissal in the 
second sample. Accordingly, one might expect that this disadvantage is traded-off by 
firms in terms of higher wage flexibility represented by a lower estimated ρ. This is 
what is indeed found in Table 4, as ρ is equal to 0.63 in the sample of “stable workers” 
and 0.61 for “all workers”. However, this ranking is completely reversed by the 
estimates of the model with mixed measurement error in Table 5, preventing us from 
any definitive conclusions about the existence of the trade-off.  
 
Some Alternative Models 
One way in which the models presented in the previous section can be extended is to 
allow the rigidity parameter ρ  to depend on observed characteristics. None of the 
existing papers on nominal rigidity have implemented such extensions. One reason 
might be that, though ease to implement, the resulting models can be difficult to 
estimate (the number of parameters increases and the data might be not rich enough to 
identify them). Likelihood convergence problems indicated that this is indeed the case 
in my data. Here I will only display the results obtained when ρ in the model with 
normal measurement error was allowed to depend on firm’s size and year dummies 
(other variables were considered as well, but they were either not significant or made 
the model difficult to converge). Two interesting results emerged. First, ρ tends to be 
larger for smaller firms. This might perhaps be surprising, but one can propose a 
sensible explanation. Large firms face a stricter employment protection legislation than 
small firms do.
12 Accordingly, the negative relation of firm’s size with the extent of 
                                                 
12 For instance, the debated article 18 of the Workers’ Statute establish that employees can only be 
dismissed with evidence of “fair cause” in firms with at least 15 employyes, while the same clause does 
not applies for firms with less than 15 employees.     
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downward nominal rigidity may suggest that large firms may recover some degree of 
general flexibility on their ability to cut nominal wages. On the contrary, small firms – 
freer to fire workers – are required to offer more implicit guarantee of wage protection. 
When a dummy for firms with more than 15 employees was entered in the equation for 
ρ, its coefficient was estimated to be negative and significant. The estimates in Table 8 
display a different specification of the relationship between the extent of nominal 
rigidity and firm’s size, by using a quadratic in (log) firm’s size. In this case, the result 
is less neat: up to firm size of about 65 employees, the relationship is negative, but then 
turns positive for firms of medium to high employment. 
As for the dependence of  ρ and year dummies, the results in Table 8 would suggest 
that over time the degree of rigidity has increased.
13 However, this result was not robust. 
Indeed, separate regression by years always failed to converge. Presumably, the reason 
has to do with the very small numbers of zero or negative wage changes that can be 
used in yearly regression to estimate ρ (number which is instead sufficiently higher 
when pooling the sample). A look at figure 1 reveals that later years have a fatter tails 
on the left of zero wage growth, i.e. there more observations to estimate ρ in the most 
recent years in the sample. This might explain the sign of the year dummies in Table 8, 
and cast doubts on the evidence that rigidity has increased over time.  
 
In the literature on wage flexibility models like (5), with proportional downward 
wage rigidity, are not the only types that have been estimated. Certain studies (Altonji 
and Devereux, 1999; Fehr and Goette, 2000) have indeed preferred models with 
threshold rigidity, where two additional parameters are introduced and estimated. 
                                                 
13 The same result was obtained if including a linear time trend in the equation for ρ.  
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According to this approach, small cuts in the notional wage (up to a cut equal to α>0) 
do not generate changes in observed wages, save for those attributable to measurement 
errors. If however the cut in the notional wage is big enough (larger than α), then 
observed wages will drop as well but by λ% (λ>0) less than what suggested by the 
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Note that this wage model contains as special cases both a model of perfect wage 
flexibility and a model of perfect downward nominal wage rigidity. In the case of 
perfect flexibility, both α and λ are zero. For perfect downward nominal wage rigidity,  
λ is arbitrary and α approaches  ∞. Because these models are nested in the general 
model (7), one can test whether the restrictions implied by either perfect rigidity or 
perfect flexibility are consistent with the data (see Altonji and Devereux, 1999). 
Table 6 shows the estimates of the threshold rigidity model described by (7). Once 
again the impact of observable characteristics is of the same magnitude and sign as in 
the models presented earlier. The variances of the two error terms too do not display any 
sizeable change with respect to the model with proportional rigidity.  
As for the rigidity parameters, it is found that all intended wage cuts that do not 
overtaken a threshold α equal to 7% are not implemented as a result of the constraints 
erected by this form of downward wage rigidity (e.g., menu costs), and any small wage 
cut which is not exactly zero is then attributed to measurement error. If, instead, 
intended wage cuts are larger than α, then observed wage changes are negative too, and 
of the amount indicated by the notional wage, as λ was estimated to be virtually zero  
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(and constrained to be so in the models displayed in Table 7). Once again, this evidence 
points to a labour market where complete upward flexibility has to be set against the 
presence of various institutional constraints that limit the ability of firms to reduce 
nominal wages by the amount they deem appropriate given the economic 
environment.
14 This approach to the estimation of nominal wage rigidity has however 
not be further pursued in the paper for the reason explained in the next session. 
 
7 Implications of the estimated nominal rigidity 
A number of measures have been used by the literature to provide a hint of the real 
implication of the estimated downward nominal rigidity. One advantage of the 
proportional rigidity model over the threshold rigidity model is their ability to provide a 
direct estimate of the proportion of employees affected by DNWR, which can then be 
used to provide implications for the costs of these rigidity. Besides, there are also 
contingent reasons for preferring the former approach: the estimates provided are fairly 
robust to various specification and sample selections (as shown in section 6), while 
convergence problems for the threshold model indicated that this approach is a less 
appropriate description of the nominal wage dynamics and rigidities for Italy during the 
sample period. The estimated consequences of nominal rigidity that I discuss below 
therefore use the estimates obtained with the proportional rigidity model in (5). The 
alternative measurement assumptions for the measurement error (normal or mixed) 
made little difference in the estimated implications of nominal rigidity.  
 The first measure that I consider is the share of the observations in the sample which 
can be expected to actually face the constraint represented by DNWR. Though the 
                                                 
14 Estimates obtained by Altonji and Devereux (1999) using model (7) on their PSID sample are as 




ε=.017, suggesting that their data show more downward rigidity 
and less measurement error problems (see their Table A2).      
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Italian labour market seems to show a high degree of resistance to implementing 
nominal wage cuts when these cuts are required, one in fact can ask if the constraints 
are actually binding for any large number of individuals. For it is not sufficient to know 
that, in principle, drops in notional wage changes may be prevented by the operation of 
nominal rigidity; one has also to assess how often the actual individual, firm and 
aggregate conditions suggest that a wage reduction (a drop in the notional wage) is 
required. If notional wage cuts are very unusual – given the prevailing conditions – then 
it may not matter a lot that these cuts would be prevented by a fairly high degree of 
downward nominal rigidity. In fact, one can write the probability,  it r , of a wage freeze 
for individual i at time t as: 
(8)  it r  =  () 0 Pr ˆ
* < ∆ ⋅ it w ρ  =  ( ) ε σ β ρ ˆ / ˆ ˆ it x − Φ ⋅ . 
 
The share of observations R affected by DNWR is then estimated by: 
 






where N is the number of observations in the sample. 
When the estimates of Table 4 are used, I compute that R ˆ =11% only. This confirms 
the idea that, though nominal wages can be considered as fairly rigid downwardly, the 
conditions of Italian labour market during the eighties and the nineties have generally 
required wage increases, particularly important to keep up with inflation and 
productivity growth. 
The measure R can also be computed by postulating various scenarios of steady-state 
level of inflations. When the economy is in steady state there are no expectations of 
changes in inflation and unemployment. A simple way of examining how binding it is  
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the constraint of DNWR for various levels of steady-state levels of inflation, I have 
recomputed  it r  in (8) after:  
(i) setting current and lagged changes in inflation to zero,  
(ii) replacing observed inflation with various assumptions about the level of steady-
state inflation, and  
(iii) force the coefficient of inflation to be equal 1 (as postulated by a standard 
steady-state formulation of the Phillips curve). After making these adjustments, the 
resulting share of observations affected by DNWR in the sample – as a function of a 
postulated level of inflation – is computed as in (9) and is denoted R(π) . 
Figure 5 depicts the values of R(π) for different values of π. It shows that the impact 
of DNWR is relatively high for very low rate of steady-state inflations, with about 18% 
of the observations in the sample receiving wage freezes if inflation is equal to zero. As 
inflation grows, R gets smaller; at an inflation rate of, say, 10% less than 3% of the 
observations in the sample would be affected by DNWR. 
 
Another measure typically computed by the literature to quantify the real relevance 
of the estimated DNWR, is the extent by which the expected observed wage change is 
higher than the expected notional change. In fact, when DNWR is in place, a certain 
number of notional wage cuts are not implemented, which implies that the expected 
notional wage growth is less than the expected observed wage growth. The difference 
between these two expected changes is called the sweep-up, which is computed at an 
individual level as: 




it w E w E ∆ − ∆   
=  ( ) ( ) [ ] β − σ β Φ β + σ β φ σ ⋅ ρ ε ε ε ˆ x ˆ / ˆ x ˆ x ˆ / ˆ x ˆ ˆ it it it it   
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where 
*
it w E∆  is – from (1) - simply  β ˆ xit , while 
a
it w E∆  can be computed from (5). 
Aggregate sweep-up is obtained by averaging over the sample’s observations:  






Using the estimates of Table (5), the aggregate sweep up in my sample was about 
0.005. This means that DNWR has the effect of increasing the expected observed wage 
growth over the notional by about 0.5 percentage points. One can also compute the 
aggregate sweep-up for various scenarios of steady-state inflations, as done with respect 
to R(π). The results indicate that at zero inflation, the sweep up is about 1% point, and 
gets smaller as inflation raises, up to becoming negligible for inflation rates of say 10%.   
 
Finally, one can also compute measures that assess the effect of DNWR on the long-
run unemployment rate. According to a standard accelerationist Phillips curve, inflation 
will accelerate or decelerate depending on whether unemployment is below or above the 
natural rate, while any existing rate of inflation will continue if unemployment is at the 
natural rate. The natural rate is thus the minimum, and only, sustainable rate of 
unemployment, but the inflation rate is left as a choice variable for policymakers. Since 
complete price stability has attractive features, many commentators who accept the 
natural rate hypothesis believe the central bank should target zero inflation. Akerlof et 
al. (1996) question the standard version of the natural rate model and each of these 
implications. They investigate the consequences of accounting for DNWR in a model 
that otherwise resembles a standard natural rate model and show that there is no natural 
unemployment rate. Rather, the rate of unemployment that is consistent with steady 
inflation itself depend on the inflation rate. In the long run, a moderate steady rate of  
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inflation permits maximum employment and output in the simulated version of their 
model. Maintenance of zero inflation, instead, measurably increases the sustainable 
unemployment rate and correspondingly reduces the level of output.  
Central to their argument, is a modified version of the Phillips curve, which they 
write as follows: 
  (13)  πt= πt
e +a(u
LS-ut) + st 
where πt
e denotes the expected rate of inflation, ut is the rate of unemployment in t, 
u
LS is the lowest sustainable rate of unemployment and st is a term reflecting the effect 
of DNWR on the standard accelerationist Phillips curve. In particular, st is interpreted as 
a shift in expected unit labour costs arising from DNWR and enters linearly in (13) the 
same as a shift in labour costs arising from any other reasons different than DNWR. In 
the definition of Akerlof et al., st  is the real wage wedge relative to the level of the real 
wage (RWW), which measures the wedge (and therefore the cost) introduced by 
DNWR between the expected aggregate actual and notional real wage levels. It can be 
easily shown that, in turn, the RWW is equal to the aggregate sweep up, AS.
15 In the 
long run, when πt=πt
e, equation (13) implicates that the unemployment rate with non-
accelerating inflation, the so-called NAIRU, is written as: 






The NAIRU can be larger than the lowest sustainable rate of unemployment if the 
relative real wage wedge s is positive. DNWR – by creating a wedge between the actual 
and notional real wage – can indeed create an excess long-run unemployment (u
NAIRU- 
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u
LS ) given by (1/a) st, where st is of the same size as in (11) and can again be computed 
for different level of steady-state inflation. The only missing information to compute the 
excess long-run unemployment in (14) is an estimate of a. The values reported for 
Germany (Knoppik and Beissenger, 2001) and the US (Stiglitz, 1999) range from about 
a=0.1 to about a=0.5. Rather than using any of the available estimates for Italy (e.g. 
Golinelli, 1998), I have here preferred to report the excess long-run unemployment rate 
obtained for various values of a and for alternative scenario for the rate of inflation, 
including values  (see Table 9). At zero inflation, a value of alpha equal to 0.4 (as the 
one used by Knoppik and Beissenger for Germany) implies that DNWR produces 
additional long-run unemployment of about 2 percentage points. This shows the danger 
of aiming at a very low inflation rate in a country whose labour market institutions and 
practise still entail a relatively high set of constraints to firm’s desired wage changes. As 
estimates for Germany, a country that shares many of the Italian labour market 
rigidities, are in the range of those reported here, EU central bankers have additional 
reasons to think twice before setting extremely low inflation targets or either should 
strongly encourage the so-often invoked EU labour markets reforms.     
 
7. Conclusions 
Using administrative longitudinal micro-data from the Social Security Institute 
(INPS), this paper has estimated the extent of downward nominal wage rigidity in Italy. 
The descriptive analysis of the year-to-year wage change distribution reveals little 
degree of downward nominal wage rigidity, with many of the annual distributions 
revealing that no important spikes at zero wage growth are observed, while wage cuts 
seem to occur even in expansionary periods. The tentative conclusion that Italy’s wage  
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structure is flexible is however at variance with the conventional description of the 
country as with fairly rigid labour market institutions. 
  The empirical strategy of the paper has then been that of using an econometric 
model apt to circumvent the limits of the data. The determinants of wage changes have 
been explicitly modelled, as well as the measurement error deriving from the fact that 
earnings, not hourly wages, are observed in the data, and earnings are gross of such 
items as benefits and overtime. Proportional and threshold rigidity models have been 
estimated, both pointing to the existence of significant impediments to the firm ability 
to implement optimal wage reductions. According to the first approach, around 50%-
64% of all notional wage cuts are prevented by the existence of proportional downward 
nominal wage rigidity. With the second approach, a threshold of about 7% has to be 
overtaken before any desired wage cut can be implemented. On the contrary, models of 
rigidity that did not account for measurement error delivered much lower estimates of 
the degree of rigidity, and distorted the real picture of the wage dynamics almost as 
much as the descriptive evidence of the wage change distributions.    
The estimated models were then used to compute various implications of the extent 
of downward nominal wage rigidity, particularly in terms of its costs for the long-run 
unemployment rate. Though moderate, these costs are not negligible and might suggest 
that, given the existing degree of downward nominal wage rigidity, a zero inflation 
policy might be a costly option, while a low but non-zero target might deliver a lower 
long-run unemployment rate and higher output.  
A note of caution should however accompany the conclusions of the paper. It has 
been argued that a labour market with downwardly rigid nominal wages can bring about 
important macroeconomic costs in the face of a low inflation rate, as real wages would  
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be made sticky by both nominal wage rigidities and slow moving prices. In this respect, 
the case of Italy falls somewhat in between, as a high degree of nominal rigidities is 
accompanied – since the mid eighties through the mid nineties – by a rate of inflation 
that is better described as moderate, rather than low. It is unclear, though, how far 
results – and in particular their real consequences - obtained with the levels of inflations 
of the eighties and nineties can be carried over to scenarios where prices grows by, say, 
only 2%.  
Finally, future research may add further important insight on a number of important 
issues that the present paper has been unable to investigate, such as the assessment of 
how far firms supplement wages with bonuses or use overtime as a means of 
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Appendix A: Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1: Wage changes and inflation 
 
 
      Number  of    median  median    Median inflation 
year  Wage freezes  wage cuts  wage increase  Observations    wage cut  wage increase    Wage change  rate 
1985 0.04  0.08  0.89  16742    -0.038 0.076    0.067 0.058 
1986 0.02  0.05  0.94  22077    -0.043 0.097    0.093 0.047 
1987 0.02  0.08  0.90  23669    -0.037 0.078    0.071 0.051 
1988 0.02  0.06  0.92  24652    -0.037 0.090    0.084 0.063 
1989 0.02  0.06  0.92  20814    -0.038 0.087    0.081 0.065 
1990 0.01  0.04  0.95  20579    -0.041 0.112    0.107 0.063 
1991 0.03  0.11  0.86  24595    -0.034 0.069    0.058 0.053 
1992 0.03  0.15  0.82  23810    -0.034 0.057    0.048 0.046 
1993 0.04  0.14  0.82  24992    -0.035 0.051    0.041 0.041 
1994 0.03  0.11  0.86  26103    -0.033 0.061    0.052 0.052 
1995 0.03  0.15  0.81  26552    -0.033 0.056    0.044 0.040 
                  
total   0.03 0.09  0.88  254585    -0.037 0.076    0.066 0.053 
 
Notes: Wages changes exceeding the outside the 1
st-99
th percentile range have been trimmed. Then the sample has been restricted to employees working 312 days a year.  
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Note: All workers sample. Two vertical bars are drawn for each distribution: one at zero wage growth, the other at the inflation rate for the year. 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
 
A) All workers  
 
variable  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev  .       Min  Max 
ln( wage change)  462307  0.069 0.079 -0.228 0.375 
ln(firm size)  461644 5.00  2.917  0  11.65 
ln(firm size) squared  461644 33.55  35.10  0  135.68 
worker's age  462307  0.037 0.010 0.015 0.063 
age squared  462307  1.507 0.777 0.225  3.97 
growing firm  462307 0.415  0.493  0  1 
shrinking firm  462307 0.405  0.491  0  1 
sector1  461861 0.036  0.187  0  1 
sector2  461861 0.095  0.294  0  1 
sector3  461861 0.258  0.437  0  1 
sector5  461861 0.165  0.371  0  1 
sector6  461861 0.074  0.262  0  1 
sector7  461861 0.114  0.318  0  1 
north East  462162 0.234  0.424  0  1 
centrer  462162 0.187  0.389  0  1 
south  462162 0.163  0.369  0  1 
female  462301 0.275  0.446  0  1 
female*age  462301 0.009  0.016  0  0.063 
manager  462065 0.009  0.096  0  1 
apprentice  462065 0.013  0.112  0  1 
white-collar  462065 0.387  0.487  0  1 
white collar * age  462065 0.014  0.019  0  0.063 
inflation  462307  0.052 0.008 0.039 0.064 
lagged inflation  462307 0.056 0.0124 0.040  0.091 
unemployment rate       
    level  462307 1.020  0.098  0.86  1.16 
first difference  462307 0.280  0.693  -1.1  1.3 
lagged first differ.  462307 0.318  0.710  -1.1  1.3 
firm's age       
< 1 year  461857 0.033  0.177  0  1 
1-5 years  461857 0.116  0.320  0  1 
10-20 years  461857 0.387  0.487  0  1 
> 20 years  461857 0.322  0.467  0  1 
trend  462307 6.150  3.158  1  11 
 
Legend.  
sector1: "energia, gas, acqua"; sector2: "estratt., manif. trasform. min."; sector3: "manif. trasformaz. metal."; sector4 
(omitted category): "manif. aliment., tess."; sector5 "commercio, ingr., dett."; sector6 "trasporti e comunic."; sector7: 
"credito., assicuraz., servizi impr."   
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B) “Stable” workers (reporting 312 paid days a year) 
 
variable  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev  .       Min  Max 
ln( wage change)  254585  0.073 0.073 -0.228 0.375 
ln(firm size)  254189 5.173  2.934  0  11.65 
ln(firm size) squared  254189 35.37  35.98  0  135.68 
worker's age  254585  0.038 0.010 0.015 0.063 
age squared  254585  1.544 0.769 0.225 3.969 
growing firm  254585 0.448  0.497  0  1 
shrinking firm  254585 0.380  0.485  0  1 
sector1  254290 0.052  0.223  0  1 
sector2  254290 0.092  0.289  0  1 
sector3  254290 0.219  0.414  0  1 
sector5  254290 0.198  0.398  0  1 
sector6  254290 0.076  0.266  0  1 
sector7  254290 0.159  0.366  0  1 
north East  254497 0.250  0.433  0  1 
centrer  254497 0.178  0.382  0  1 
south  254497 0.132  0.339  0  1 
female  254582 0.265  0.441  0  1 
female*age  254582 0.009  0.016  0  0.063 
manager  254370 0.014  0.119  0  1 
apprentice  254370 0.005  0.070  0  1 
white-collar  254370 0.535  0.498  0  1 
white collar * age  254370 0.020  0.020  0  0.063 
inflation  254585  0.052 0.008 0.039 0.065 
lagged inflation  254585  0.056 0.012 0.040 0.092 
Unemployment rate       
    Level  254585 1.022  0.099  0.86  1.16 
first difference  254585 0.270  0.684  -1.1  1.3 
lagged first differ.  254585 0.315  0.702  -1.1  1.3 
firm's age       
< 1 year  254289 0.023  0.165  0  1 
1-5 years  254289 0.109  0.312  0  1 
10-20 years  254289 0.380  0.485  0  1 
> 20 years  254289 0.350  0.477  0  1 
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C) “stable” men (with 312 paid days per year) 
 
Variable  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev  .       Min  Max 
ln( wage change)  187081  0.074 0.075 -0.228 0.375 
ln(firm size)  186813 5.45  2.957  0  11.65 
ln(firm size) squared  186813 38.48  37.47  0  135.68 
worker's age  187081  0.039 0.010 0.015 0.063 
age squared  187081  1.631 0.776 0.225 3.969 
growing firm  187081 0.453  0.498  0  1 
shrinking firm  187081 0.395  0.489  0  1 
sector1  186876 0.064  0.244  0  1 
sector2  186876 0.101  0.302  0  1 
sector3  186876 0.241  0.428  0  1 
sector5  186876 0.174  0.379  0  1 
sector6  186876 0.093  0.289  0  1 
sector7  186876 0.142  0.349  0  1 
north East  187016 0.247  0.431  0  1 
centrer  187016 0.181  0.385  0  1 
south  187016 0.150  0.357  0  1 
female  187081  0 0 0 0 
female*age  187081  0 0 0 0 
manager  186949 0.0182  0.134  0  1 
apprentice  186949 0.004  0.063  0  1 
white-collar  186949 0.470  0.499  0  1 
white collar * age  186949 0.019  0.020  0  0.063 
inflation  187081  0.052 0.008 0.039 0.065 
lagged inflation  187081  0.056 0.012 0.040 0.092 
unemployment rate       
    level  187081 1.021  0.099  0.86  1.16 
first difference  187081 0.267  0.684  -1.1  1.3 
lagged first differ.  187081 0.313  0.702  -1.1  1.3 
firm's age       
< 1 year  186875 0.026  0.158  0  1 
1-5 years  186875 0.099  0.293  0  1 
10-20 years  186875 0.380  0.485  0  1 
> 20 years  186875 0.371  0.483  0  1 
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Table 3. Wage change regression. OLS estimates. 
 
Rigidity type  None (simple OLS)    None (simple OLS)    None (simple OLS) 
Measurement error  No    No    No 
Sample  all workers    stable workers    all stabel men 
              
dip. Var. :   robust     robust     robust 
ln( wage change)  Coeff. s.e.   Coeff. s.e.    Coeff. s.e. 
ln(firm size)  0.002 0.000    0.000 0.000    0.001 0.000 
ln(firm size) squared  0.000 0.000    0.000 0.000    0.000 0.000 
worker's age  -1.347 0.089   -1.460 0.116    -1.466 0.133 
age squared  0.013 0.001    0.013 0.001    0.013 0.002 
growing firm  0.005 0.001    0.006 0.001    0.006 0.001 
shrinking firm  -0.004 0.001   -0.003 0.001    -0.003 0.001 
sector1  0.016 0.002    0.012 0.001    0.011 0.001 
sector2  0.005 0.001    0.005 0.001    0.004 0.001 
sector3  0.003 0.000    0.003 0.001    0.003 0.001 
sector5  0.004 0.000    0.000 0.000    -0.001 0.001 
sector6  0.007 0.001    0.002 0.002    0.001 0.002 
sector7  0.008 0.001    0.005 0.001    0.003 0.001 
north East  0.002 0.000    0.000 0.000    0.000 0.000 
centrer  -0.002 0.000   -0.001 0.001    -0.002 0.001 
south  -0.004 0.001   -0.004 0.001    -0.005 0.001 
female  -0.016 0.001   -0.019 0.001       
female*age  0.265 0.026    0.338 0.032       
manager  0.025 0.001    0.024 0.001    0.024 0.001 
apprentice  0.076 0.001    0.079 0.002    0.071 0.003 
white-collar  0.031 0.001    0.026 0.001    0.026 0.001 
white collar * age  -0.463 0.028   -0.396 0.029    -0.404 0.035 
inflation  0.730 0.080    0.519 0.089    0.564 0.106 
lagged inflation  -0.089 0.065   -0.172 0.042    -0.162 0.049 
unemployment rate              
level  -0.037 0.011   -0.042 0.016    -0.037 0.020 
first difference  -0.011 0.000   -0.013 0.001    -0.013 0.001 
lagged first differ.  0.003 0.001    0.004 0.002    0.005 0.002 
firm's age              
< 1 year  0.003 0.001    0.004 0.001    0.004 0.001 
1-5 years  0.001 0.001    0.001 0.001    0.001 0.001 
10-20 years  -0.001 0.000   0.000 0.001    0.001 0.001 
> 20 years  -0.001 0.001   -0.001 0.001    -0.001 0.001 
trend  -0.002 0.000   -0.003 0.000    -0.003 0.000 
constant  0.108 0.014    0.148 0.019    0.141 0.024 
              
sigma  0.076     0.070     0.072  
 
              
Number of observations  461247     253882    186615  
Number of clusters  64327    41663     29455  
Log-Likelihood              
R-squared  0.074     0.090     0.087   
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Table 4. ML estimates of wage changes and downward wage rigidity.    
 
Rigidity type    proportional    proportional    proportional 
Measurement error    No    No    No 
                
Sample    all workers    stable workers    stable men 
                
dip. Var. :     robust     robust     robust 
ln( wage change)    Coeff. s.e.    Coeff. s.e.    Coeff. s.e. 
ln(firm size)    0.002 0.000    0.000 0.000    0.001 0.000 
ln(firm size) squared    0.000 0.000    0.000 0.000    0.000 0.000 
worker's age    -1.327 0.091    -1.451 0.119    -1.462 0.136 
age squared    0.013 0.001    0.013 0.001    0.013 0.002 
growing firm    0.005 0.001    0.006 0.001    0.006 0.001 
shrinking firm    -0.004 0.001    -0.003 0.001    -0.003 0.001 
sector1    0.016 0.002    0.012 0.001    0.012 0.001 
sector2    0.005 0.001    0.005 0.001    0.004 0.001 
sector3    0.003 0.000    0.004 0.001    0.003 0.001 
sector5    0.004 0.000    0.000 0.000    0.000 0.001 
sector6    0.007 0.001    0.001 0.002    0.001 0.002 
sector7    0.008 0.001    0.004 0.001    0.003 0.001 
north East    0.002 0.000    0.000 0.000    0.000 0.000 
centrer    -0.002 0.000    -0.001 0.001    -0.002 0.001 
south    -0.004 0.001    -0.005 0.001    -0.006 0.001 
female    -0.016 0.001    -0.019 0.001       
female*age    0.259 0.026    0.335 0.033       
manager    0.025 0.001    0.025 0.001    0.024 0.001 
apprentice    0.077 0.001    0.080 0.003    0.071 0.003 
white-collar    0.031 0.001    0.027 0.001    0.027 0.002 
white collar * age    -0.462 0.029    -0.393 0.029    -0.400 0.036 
inflation    0.741 0.081    0.527 0.091    0.573 0.107 
lagged inflation    -0.096 0.067    -0.184 0.044    -0.172 0.051 
unemployment rate                
level    -0.038 0.011    -0.043 0.017    -0.038 0.020 
first difference    -0.011 0.000    -0.013 0.001    -0.014 0.001 
lagged first differ.    0.003 0.001    0.004 0.002    0.005 0.003 
firm's age                
< 1 year    0.003 0.001    0.004 0.001    0.004 0.001 
1-5 years    0.001 0.001    0.001 0.001    0.001 0.001 
10-20 years    0.000 0.000    0.000 0.001    0.001 0.001 
> 20 years    -0.001 0.001    -0.001 0.001    -0.001 0.001 
trend    -0.002 0.000    -0.003 0.000    -0.004 0.000 
constant    0.107 0.014    0.148 0.020    0.141 0.025 
                
rho    0.206 0.014    0.217 0.019    0.204 0.021 
sigma    0.078 0.000    0.072 0.000    0.073 0.000 
                
                
Number of observations    461247     253882     186615  
Number of clusters    64327     41663     29455  
Log-Likelihood    548021     277201     199268  
                
Notes: Asymptotic standard erorrs are robust to the opresence of repeated observations within firms and on the same employee.  
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Table 5. ML estimates of wage changes and downward wage rigidity. 
 
Rigidity type    proportional    proportional    proportional 
Measurement error    normal    normal    normal 
                
Sample    all workers    stable workers    stable men 
                
dip. Var. :     robust     robust     robust 
ln( wage change)    Coeff. s.e.    Coeff. s.e.    Coeff. s.e. 
ln(firm size)    0.002 0.000    0.001 0.000    0.001 0.000 
ln(firm size) squared    0.000 0.000    0.000 0.000    0.000 0.000 
worker's age    -1.514 0.098    -1.631 0.128    -1.660 0.147 
age squared    0.014 0.001    0.014 0.002    0.015 0.002 
growing firm    0.006 0.001    0.007 0.001    0.007 0.001 
shrinking firm    -0.004 0.001    -0.003 0.001    -0.003 0.001 
sector1    0.017 0.002    0.013 0.002    0.013 0.002 
sector2    0.006 0.001    0.006 0.001    0.005 0.001 
sector3    0.004 0.001    0.004 0.001    0.004 0.001 
sector5    0.004 0.000    0.000 0.001    -0.001 0.001 
sector6    0.008 0.001    0.002 0.002    0.001 0.002 
sector7    0.009 0.001    0.005 0.001    0.004 0.001 
north East    0.002 0.000    0.000 0.000    0.000 0.000 
centrer    -0.002 0.000    -0.001 0.001    -0.002 0.001 
south    -0.004 0.001    -0.005 0.001    -0.006 0.001 
female    -0.017 0.001    -0.020 0.001       
female*age    0.281 0.028    0.356 0.036       
manager    0.027 0.001    0.026 0.001    0.026 0.001 
apprentice    0.080 0.001    0.082 0.003    0.073 0.003 
white-collar    0.033 0.001    0.029 0.001    0.029 0.002 
white collar * age    -0.513 0.031    -0.437 0.032    -0.441 0.039 
inflation    0.792 0.087    0.577 0.095    0.625 0.112 
lagged inflation    -0.106 0.070    -0.199 0.049    -0.184 0.057 
unemployment rate                
level    -0.039 0.012    -0.045 0.018    -0.039 0.022 
first difference    -0.012 0.001    -0.014 0.001    -0.015 0.001 
lagged first differ.    0.003 0.002    0.004 0.002    0.005 0.003 
firm's age                
< 1 year    0.003 0.001    0.005 0.001    0.004 0.001 
1-5 years    0.001 0.001    0.001 0.001    0.001 0.001 
10-20 years   -0.001  0.001   0.000  0.001    0.000  0.001 
> 20 years    -0.001 0.001    -0.002 0.001    -0.001 0.001 
trend    -0.003 0.000    -0.004 0.000    -0.004 0.000 
constant    0.109 0.015    0.151 0.022    0.143 0.027 
                
rho    0.611 0.012    0.633 0.015    0.632 0.018 
                
sigma(m)    0.031 0.000    0.029 0.000    0.030 0.000 
sigma(e)    0.0741 0.0003    0.0685 0.0005   0.0704 0.0006 
                
                
Number of observations    461247     253882    186615  
Number of clusters    64327     41663     29455  
Log-Likelihood    537709     316235    227865  
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Table 6. ML estimates of wage changes and downward wage rigidity.  
 
Rigidity type  proportional    proportional    proportional 
Measurement error  mixed    mixed    Mixed 
                
Sample    all workers    stable workers    stable men 
                
dip. Var. :   robust     robust     robust 
ln( wage change)  Coeff. s.e.    Coeff. s.e.    Coeff. s.e. 
ln(firm size)   0.0021  0.0001    0.0013  0.0002    0.0016 0.0002 
ln(firm size) squared  -0.0001 0.0000    -0.0001  0.0000    -0.0001  0.0000 
worker's age  -1.1000 0.0754    -1.2785  0.1004    -1.3423  0.1202 
age squared  0.0103 0.0009    0.0114  0.0012    0.0120  0.0015 
growing firm  0.0036 0.0003    0.0048  0.0004    0.0052  0.0005 
shrinking firm  -0.0029 0.0003    -0.0023  0.0004    -0.0024  0.0005 
sector1   0.0154  0.0006    0.0137  0.0007    0.0129 0.0008 
sector2   0.0049  0.0003    0.0055  0.0005    0.0046 0.0006 
sector3   0.0036  0.0003    0.0048  0.0004    0.0046 0.0004 
sector5   0.0029  0.0003    0.0010  0.0004    0.0005 0.0005 
sector6   0.0031  0.0004    -0.0004  0.0005    -0.0011 0.0006 
sector7   0.0049  0.0004    0.0034  0.0004    0.0023 0.0006 
north East  0.0006 0.0002    -0.0001  0.0003    -0.0001  0.0004 
centrer   -0.0018  0.0003    -0.0014  0.0003    -0.0018 0.0004 
south   -0.0038  0.0003    -0.0042  0.0004    -0.0049 0.0004 
female   -0.0128  0.0008    -0.0146  0.0011       
female*age  0.2069 0.0216    0.2578  0.0294       
manager   0.0196  0.0010    0.0207  0.0010    0.0208 0.0011 
apprentice  0.0711 0.0011    0.0761  0.0022    0.0684  0.0027 
white-collar  0.0244 0.0008    0.0222  0.0010    0.0224  0.0012 
white collar * age  -0.3919 0.0198    -0.3569  0.0251    -0.3627  0.0306 
inflation  0.4775 0.0195    0.4258  0.0248    0.4847  0.0305 
lagged inflation  -0.1121 0.0111    -0.1791  0.0145    -0.1606  0.0178 
unemployment rate               
level  -0.0323 0.0020    -0.0443  0.0025    -0.0412  0.0031 
first difference   -0.0106  0.0002    -0.0118  0.0002    -0.0127 0.0003 
lagged first 
differ.   0.0009  0.0003    0.0025  0.0004    0.0035 0.0005 
firm's age            0.0022  0.0010 
< 1 year   0.0023  0.0006    0.0027  0.0008       
1-5 years   0.0007  0.0004    0.0005  0.0005    0.0007 0.0006 
10-20 years   -0.0002  0.0003    -0.0003  0.0004    0.0000  0.0005 
> 20 years   -0.0006  0.0003    -0.0013  0.0004    -0.0010 0.0005 
trend   -0.0025  0.0000    -0.0031  0.0001    -0.0032 0.0001 
constant   0.1122  0.0027    0.1436  0.0036    0.1380 0.0044 
                  
rho   0.6798  0.0344    0.5680  0.0351    0.5146 0.0376 
                  
sigma(m)   0.1007  0.0003    0.0968  0.0004    0.0969 0.0005 
sigma(e)   0.0426  0.0001    0.0435  0.0002    0.0456 0.0002 
p   0.5948  0.0100    0.6611  0.0158    0.6546 0.0196 
                  
Number of observations  461247    253882      186615   
Number of clusters  64327    41663      29455   
Log-Likelihood  484456    290798      207893   
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Table 7. ML estimates of wage changes and downward wage rigidity.  
          
Rigidity type  threshold    threshold    threshold 
Measurement error  normal    normal    normal 
                
Sample    all workers    stable workers    stable men 
                  
dip. Var. :    robust     robust     robust 
ln( wage change)  Coeff.  s.e.    Coeff. s.e.    Coeff. s.e. 
ln(firm size)    0.0019 0.0002    0.0006 0.0002    0.0010 0.0003 
ln(firm size) squared  -0.0001 0.0000    0.0000 0.0000    -0.0001 0.0000 
worker's age  -1.5105 0.1013    -1.6382 0.1310    -1.6544 0.1538 
age squared  0.0145 0.0013    0.0144 0.0016    0.0145 0.0019 
growing firm  0.0055 0.0004    0.0071 0.0005    0.0072 0.0006 
shrinking firm  -0.0038 0.0004    -0.0027 0.0005    -0.0029 0.0007 
sector1    0.0174 0.0008    0.0134 0.0009    0.0128 0.0010 
sector2    0.0058 0.0005    0.0056 0.0006    0.0047 0.0007 
sector3    0.0039 0.0004    0.0040 0.0005    0.0039 0.0006 
sector5    0.0043 0.0004    0.0001 0.0005    -0.0007 0.0006 
sector6    0.0078 0.0005    0.0020 0.0007    0.0012 0.0008 
sector7    0.0090 0.0005    0.0054 0.0006    0.0040 0.0007 
north East  0.0015 0.0003    0.0001 0.0004    0.0000 0.0005 
centrer    -0.0022 0.0003    -0.0012 0.0004    -0.0018 0.0005 
south    -0.0040 0.0004    -0.0048 0.0005    -0.0058 0.0006 
female    -0.0173 0.0011    -0.0205 0.0015       
female*age  0.2837 0.0292    0.3596 0.0388       
manager    0.0267 0.0013    0.0264 0.0013    0.0258 0.0014 
apprentice  0.0806 0.0012    0.0827 0.0022    0.0741 0.0029 
white-collar  0.0334 0.0011    0.0289 0.0013    0.0287 0.0016 
white collar * age  -0.5112 0.0266    -0.4358 0.0327    -0.4393 0.0388 
inflation  0.7920 0.0262    0.5718 0.0324    0.6191 0.0388 
lagged inflation  -0.1020 0.0151    -0.1964 0.0192    -0.1817 0.0230 
unemployment rate              
    level  -0.0400 0.0026    -0.0453 0.0033    -0.0399 0.0040 
    first difference    -0.0119 0.0002    -0.0139 0.0003    -0.0147 0.0004 
    lagged first differ.    0.0029 0.0004    0.0039 0.0005    0.0047 0.0006 
firm's age               
   < 1 year    0.0030 0.0008    0.0050 0.0010    0.0043 0.0013 
   1-5 years    0.0012 0.0005    0.0013 0.0006    0.0014 0.0008 
   10-20 years    -0.0007 0.0004    0.0002 0.0005    0.0005 0.0006 
   > 20 years    -0.0010 0.0004    -0.0017 0.0005    -0.0012 0.0007 
trend    -0.0025 0.0001    -0.0038 0.0001    -0.0039 0.0001 
constant    0.1079 0.0037    0.1510 0.0047    0.1428 0.0056 
                 
alpha    0.0688 0.0005    0.0716 0.0007    0.0728 0.0008 
lamda    0.0 .    0.0 .    0.0 . 
                 
sigma(m)    0.0335 0.0002    0.0321 0.0002    0.0330 0.0003 
sigma(e)    0.0733 0.0001    0.0675 0.0001    0.0692 0.0002 
              
Number of observations  461247     253882     186615   
Number of clusters  64327     41663     29455   
Log-Likelihood   542974     318596     229450   
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Table 8: Proportional rigidity with normal measurement error. ρ ρ ρ ρ depends on X. 
         
ln( wage change)  Coeff.  Robust  s.e. 
worker's age  -1.3039 0.1020 
age squared  0.0121 0.0013 
growing firm  0.0067 0.0004 
shrinking firm  -0.0032 0.0004 
sector1   0.0166  0.0007 
sector2   0.0060  0.0005 
sector3   0.0034  0.0004 
sector5   0.0036  0.0004 
sector6   0.0071  0.0005 
sector7   0.0082  0.0005 
north East  0.0013 0.0003 
centrer   -0.0021  0.0004 
south   -0.0042  0.0004 
female   -0.0161  0.0011 
female*age  0.2533 0.0296 
manager   0.0255  0.0013 
apprentice  0.0780 0.0012 
white-collar  0.0323 0.0011 
white collar * age  -0.4896 0.0269 
inflation  1.2192 0.0253 
lagged inflation  0.1531 0.0145 
unemployment rate    
    level  -0.0835 0.0026 
first difference   -0.0115  0.0003 
lagged first differ.   0.0116  0.0003 
firm's age    
< 1 year   0.0026  0.0008 
1-5 years   0.0008  0.0005 
10-20 years   0.0004  0.0004 
> 20 years   -0.0020  0.0004 
constant   0.1003  0.0039 
sigma(m)   0.0277  0.0003 
sigma(e)   0.0767  0.0001 
Rho equation:      
ln_dipmed  -0.6657 0.0221 
ln_dipmed2  0.0796 0.0018 
1986   -1.5903  0.0709 
1987   -0.7859  0.0696 
1988   -0.4966  0.0806 
1989   -0.9543  0.0811 
1990   -0.8123  0.0924 
1991   0.9879  0.0792 
1992   1.4614  0.0751 
1993   3.1183  0.0778 
1994   1.9812  0.0810 
1995   1.6698  0.0788 
constant   0.9534  0.0778 
Number of observations  461247  
Number of clusters  64327   
Log-Likelihood   536574   
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Figure 4A: Proportion of Wage Cuts, Freezes and Inflation 
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Figure 4B: Nominal Wage Changes and Inflation 
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Table 9. Long-run unemployment consequences of DNWR 
 
      Excess long-run unemployment rate 
inflation 
Rate  SU    a=0.1  a=0.2 a=0.3 a=0.4 a=0.5 
0.000  0.009    9.089  4.544 3.030 2.272 1.818 
0.005  0.008    8.188  4.094 2.729 2.047 1.638 
0.010  0.007    7.355  3.678 2.452 1.839 1.471 
0.015  0.007    6.588  3.294 2.196 1.647 1.318 
0.020  0.006    5.883  2.941 1.961 1.471 1.177 
0.025  0.005    5.237  2.619 1.746 1.309 1.047 
0.030  0.005    4.649  2.324 1.550 1.162 0.930 
0.035  0.004    4.113  2.057 1.371 1.028 0.823 
0.040  0.004    3.628  1.814 1.209 0.907 0.726 
0.045  0.003    3.190  1.595 1.063 0.798 0.638 
0.050  0.003    2.796  1.398 0.932 0.699 0.559 
0.055  0.002    2.443  1.222 0.814 0.611 0.489 
0.060  0.002    2.127  1.064 0.709 0.532 0.425 
0.065  0.002    1.846  0.923 0.615 0.462 0.369 
0.070  0.002    1.597  0.799 0.532 0.399 0.319 
0.075  0.001    1.377  0.689 0.459 0.344 0.275 
0.080  0.001    1.183  0.592 0.394 0.296 0.237 
0.085  0.001    1.013  0.507 0.338 0.253 0.203 
0.090  0.001    0.865  0.432 0.288 0.216 0.173 
0.095  0.001    0.735  0.368 0.245 0.184 0.147 
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APPENDIX: DERIVATION OF THE MODELS’ LIKELIHOOD FUNCTIONS 
 
1. Proportional rigidity model 
In this appendix I sketch the derivation of the likelihood functions of the various models 
that have been estimated. See Ferh and Goette (2000), Knopick (2001), Maddala (1983) 
for the details.  
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For ease of notation, let us drop the t subscript and write simply  i c  for  β it X  and  i y  
instead of  i y ∆ . The random term ε  is assumed to be normally distributed with zero 
mean and variance 
2
ε σ . When present, the measurement error term µ  is assumed to be 
uncorrelated with ε .  
 
No measurement error 
In this case  it µ =0 and the likelihood function for model (1) is obtained as:  













































with the three pieces of the likelihood function corresponding to the three regimes in 
(1). In (2) φ  denotes the density function of the normal standard distribution and Φ the 
corresponding distribution function. Note how the probability that the observation is 
affected (not affected) by DNWR enters in the definition of the second (third) term of 
the likelihood function.  
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Normal measurement error 
To obtain the model’s likelihood function we need to derive the density function of 
i y , where  y =  c+ ε  + µ . It is here assumed that µ  is normally distributed with zero 
mean and variance 
2
µ σ . The density function of y can be written as the sum of three joint 
densities, as follows: 
(3)  () y f y   =   1 f ( y  , regime 1) +  2 f ( y  , regime 2) +  1 f ( y  , regime 3) = 
=  1 f ( y  ,  ε ≤ −c ) +  2 f ( y  ,  ε > −c  , D=1) +  3 f ( y  ,  ε > −c  , D=0)   
=  1 f ( y  ,  ε ≤ −c ) +  D f (D=1) ' 2 f ( y  ,  ε > −c ) +  D f (D=0) ' 3 f ( y ,  ε > −c ) 
=   1 f ( y  ,  ε ≤ −c ) +  ρ ' 2 f ( y  ,  ε > −c ) +  (1-ρ ) ' 3 f ( y  ,  ε > −c )   
where  D f  is the probability distribution of D, a random variable assumed to be 
independent of both y and ε .  
To derive the joint density  1 f , we first note that  y  depends on both ε  and µ . Then, the 
joint occurrence of the events ( y  ,  ε ≤ −c ) can be expressed in terms of the joint 
distribution of ε  and µ . As both random terms are assumed to be normally distributed 
(and uncorrelated), a standard result implies the following form for their joint 
distribution: 
(4)   f (ε  , µ ) = 
2 2 2
1








































Note that when  ε ≤ −c , (1) implies that µ = y - c-ε . Therefore, we can write: 
(5)   1 f (y ,  ε ≤ −c ) = 
2 2 2
1
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(see Maddala, 1983, p. 284). The integral in (5) can be given a closed form solution 
after a few algebraic steps (see Knoppick, 2001), which provides the following final 
expression: 
(6)   1 f (y ,  ε ≤ −c ) = 
2 2
1










µ ε σ σ
φ























i .  
To derive  ' 2 f , note that ε  and µ  are independent and therefore:  
























Finally, the derivation of  ' 3 f  follows the same steps as for  1 f . The difference is that 
now the integration in (5) runs from  ∞ −  to –c, instead to from –c to  ∞ + , giving:  
(8)   ' 3 f ( y  ,  ε > −c ) = 
2 2
1
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φ














i .  
The likelihood function for model (1) with normally distributed measurement error is  
therefore obtained by replacing (6)-(8) in (3), and re-interpreting the resulting density 
function of y given the vector of parameters as a function of the parameters for given 
y.  
 
Mixed measurement error 
If it is assumed that only a fraction (1-p) of the observations is affected by measurement 
error, while the remaining p is not, the definition of the observed dependent variable y is 
slightly more complex than in (1). Specifically, with probability (1-p), y is described by 
the system in (1) while, with probability p, y is instead given by: 
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The individual’s likelihood contribution is the expected value (taken over the discrete 
distribution of D) of the individual’s contributions in the likelihoods we have derived 
earlier for the case of normal measurement error and no measurement error. The 
likelihood function obtains as the product of the individuals’ contributions in the 
sample:     
  





i pL L p) 1 ( ln  
where  
(10)   
nom
i L  =
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is the individual’s likelihood contribution in the case of no measurement error, and 
(11)   
m
i L  =[]
) 0 ( 1
1
> y f []
) 0 ( 1
2
= y f []
) 0 ( 1
3
< y f  
is the individual’s likelihood contribution in the case of normal measurement error. The 
f  functions in (11) are defined in (6)-(8), while 1(j) is an indicator function taking value 
1 if expression j is true, and 0 otherwise. 
 
2. Threshold rigidity model 
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The measurement error variable is assumed to be normally distributed. Once again the 
density distribution function can be written as: 
(14)  () y f y   =   1 f ( y , regime 1) +  2 f ( y  , regime 2) +  1 f ( y  , regime 3) = 
where now the relevant regimes are the ones in (13). Correspondingly, the density 
function is slightly different than the one for the proportional rigidity with normal 
measurement error (equations (3) and (6)-(8)) to reflect the presence of α  and λ  in 
model (13), but are easily derived: 
(15)  () y f y  = 
2 2
1
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